




Fig. 1. Trends in Data Breaches, Breach Costs, and Cybersecurity Spending (2015-2021). Data on breaches is sourced from the Identity Theft Resource Center[10], breach costs from IBM[11], cybersecurity spending from Gartner[12], and cybercrime cost projections from Cybersecurity Ventures[13].









SYSTEM 1: FAST, INTUITIVE, EFFICIENT — BIAS-PRONE UNDER PRESSURE SYSTEM 2: SLOW,
ANALYTICAL, DEFENSIBLE —
RESOURCE-INTENSIVE

INCIDENT TEMPO PULLS
ANALYSTS TOWARD SYSTEM
1; AUDITS DEMAND SYSTEM 2

System Thinking and Cognitive Biases in Cybersecurity

System 1 Thinking

(Fast, Intuitive, Heuristic-driven)

Automation Bias (47%)

Over-reliance on Al outputs

Trust Calibration Bias

Alternating between trust and dismissal

Ostrich Effect (16%)

Avoiding Al warnings due to risk aversion

System 2 Thinking

(Slow, Deliberate, Analytical)

Confirmation Bias (37%)

Rejecting AI insights that contradict beliefs

Anchoring Bias (32%)

Resistance to revising initial assessments

Sectoral Differences in Bias Expression

Government (80% System 1) | Financial (70% System 1) | Consulting (60% System 1) | Industrial (50% System 1)



Data snapshot: Trust is brittle




Mixed trust in AI alerts; skepticism common in regulated sectors



Dynamic trust calibration: swing between over-reliance and rejection



Explainability gaps and false positives drive most skepticism




RQ2: Adoption blockers in incident response

False positives → alert fatigue → learned distrust

Opaque alerts → weak accountability → decision paralysis

Workflow misfit:
when Al outputs
don't map to
playbooks, they're
ignored







Explainable AI (XAI): surface evidence, logic paths, uncertainty



Bias-aware training: name the traps; rehearse counter-moves



Adaptive trust calibration: learn from analyst feedback; adjust thresholds



BUILD EXPLANATIONS FIRST, NOT LAST: PROVENANCE, LOGIC TREES, COUNTERFACTUALS

EMBED FEEDBACK LOOPS:

ANALYST

ACCEPTS/OVERRIDES →

MODEL LEARNS

HUMAN-IN-CONTROL
DEFAULTS FOR HIGH-IMPACT
ACTIONS (CONTAINMENT,
PURGE)



So what did I find



